In Praise of Friendly by Pollak, Louis H.
1984]
IN PRAISE OF FRIENDLY
Louis H. POLLAKt
I.
It is indeed gratifying that the editorial board of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review has dedicated this issue to Henry J.
Friendly. Judge Friendly has strong and enduring links with this Uni-
versity: the Judge's daughter, Professor Joan Goodman, is a leading
member of the faculty of the School of Education. His son-in-law, Pro-
fessor Frank Goodman, is a leading member of the faculty of the Law
School. And his father-in-law, the late Horace Stern, was a revered
alumnus of this University, who attained enduring eminence as Chief
Justice of Pennsylvania. But these sentimental ties are not in them-
selves reasons for honoring Judge Friendly. They simply add cheerful
dimension to a welcome event.
The reason for honoring Henry Friendly is that he has achieved
greatly in the law. He has practiced law with great distinction. He has
judged with even greater distinction. In twenty-five immensely produc-
tive years on the Second Circuit, Henry Friendly-like Learned Hand
before him-has exercised more decisive influence on the development
of American law than any other contemporary federal judge, save only
certain of the Justices of the Supreme Court.
There is a particular aspect of Henry Friendly's work that is de-
serving of special comment. He is a judge who-in the tradition of
Kent, Story, Holmes, Cardozo, and Frankfurter-has shaped the law
not alone through his opinions but also through his extrajudicial writ-
ings. This paper will consider a subject-diversity jurisdiction-to
which Friendly has, over a span of decades, devoted important schol-
arly efforts that have enriched our understanding of the federal judicial
process."
t District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania. A.B. 1943, Harvard University; LL.B. 1948, Yale University.
1 This paper will not consider other areas of the law to which Judge Friendly has
contributed scholarship of at least equal consequence; see, e.g., the lecture he delivered
at Dartmouth on the sesquicentennial of the Dartmouth College Case, H. FRIENDLY,
THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA (1963), and
his Roberts Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania, Friendly, Some Kind of Hear-
ing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
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II.
A.
The steady expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
especially since Reconstruction days, has been but a reflex of
the general growth of federal political power. That growth
will not abate, since it is responsive to deep social and eco-
nomic causes. Only one aspect of the work of the federal
courts is out of the current of these nationalizing forces-the
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. This had its or-
igin in fears of local hostilities, which had only a speculative
existence in 1789, and are still less real today. The unifying
tendencies of America here make for a recession of jurisdic-
tion to the states, rather than an extension of federal author-
ity. The pressure of distinctively federal litigation may call
for relief of business that intrinsically belongs to the state
courts. How far, if at all, the United States courts should be
left with jurisdiction merely because the parties are citizens
of different states is a question which calls for critical reex-
amination of the practical bases of diversity jurisdiction. To
such a reexamination the present study may serve as an
introduction.
These magisterial words were written by the youthful Henry
Friendly: they comprise the concluding paragraph of The Historic Basis
of Diversity Jurisdiction, Friendly's first piece of published scholar-
ship.2 Friendly's paper appeared in the Harvard Law Review in Feb-
ruary of 1928, eight months after he graduated from Harvard Law
School. The paper must have been conceived when the author was still
in student status, for he was at pains to acknowledge his substantial
indebtedness "to Professor Felix Frankfurter . . .both for suggesting
the subject of this paper and for constant help in its preparation.' But
the bulk of work on the paper appears to have been done just after
Friendly left Cambridge-in the summer of 1927, at the Bar Associa-
tion of the City of New York.4 This would have been just before
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483,
510 (1928). Friendly calls this his "first signed piece of legal writing." H. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDIcTION 140 (1973). One detects a negative pregnant signifying that
some of the anonymous student work contained in volumes 39 and 40 of the Harvard
Law Review was written or edited by Friendly: Friendly was an editor of volume 39
and President of volume 40.
3 Friendly, supra note 2, at 483.
4 Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
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Friendly went to Washington to take up his duties as law clerk to Jus-
tice Brandeis-a position for which, one may reasonably surmise,
Friendly was warmly recommended by his professor.
The opening paragraph of Friendly's paper on the history of di-
versity jurisdiction announced its purpose-to answer questions posed
by Professor James Bradley Thayer almost forty years earlier: "Why is
it that a United States court is given this duty of administering the law
of another jurisdiction? Why did the States allow it? Why was it im-
portant that the United States should have it?"' These questions,
Friendly said, were "not purely academic." Diversity jurisdiction was
more and more being called into question. In 1914, a distinguished
committee-Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School, President
Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University, Louis Brandeis (not yet a
Justice), Moorfield Storey, and Adolf J. Rodenbeck-had published a
Preliminary Report on Efficiency in the Administration of Justice,
which found, inter alia, that "concurrent jurisdiction of state and fed-
eral courts on the ground of diverse citizenship often causes much de-
lay, expense, and uncertainty." 6 By the time Friendly turned his atten-
tion to the matter, remedial legislation seemed a lively possibility. If
such legislation were to be sensibly conceived, Professor Thayer's ques-
tions had to be addressed.
Friendly's article was and remains the authoritative study of the
genesis and early days of diversity jurisdiction. Friendly first examined
the intense debate (most of it in the ratifying conventions) generated by
the inclusion of diversity jurisdiction among the heads of federal judi-
cial power described in article III of the Constitution. Friendly then
turned to the limitations on diversity jurisdiction written into the First
Judiciary Act 7-limitations, for the most part (except for the one-year
interlude of the abortive 1801 Judiciary Act"), that have obtained ever
since. Finally, Friendly discussed the principal cases on diversity juris-
diction decided by the Ellsworth and Marshall Courts-cases such as
Bingham v. Cabot,' Turner v. Bank of North America,10 Hepburn and
L. REv. 383 (1964).
5 Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REv. 311, 316 (1981),
quoted in Friendly, supra note 2, at 483.
1 Friendly, supra note 2, at 483 n.2.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (current version codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
s Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).
o 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382 (1798) (requiring that citizenship of parties be pleaded).
10 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799) (upholding Judiciary Act's assignee clause precluding
suit on assigned chose in action unless suit could have been maintained by assignor); see
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).
42 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Dundas v. Ellzey,11 Strawbridge v. Curtiss,12 and Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux33
Since Friendly's focus was on the beginnings of diversity jurisdic-
tion, he did not carry the case law discussion beyond the early Mar-
shall years. In particular, Swift v. Tyson,14 decided in 1842, lay far
beyond Friendly's horizon. There, it will be recalled, Justice Story, in
concluding that an idiosyncratic New York rule of negotiable instru-
ments law should not be held to govern a diversity case tried in a New
York federal court, gave a very limited construction to the directive of
the so-called Rules of Decision Act-section 34 of the First Judiciary
Act-that "[t]he laws of the several States, except where the Constitu-
tion, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or pro-
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in
the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 5 According
to Justice Story,
the true interpretation of the 34th section limited its applica-
tion to state laws, strictly local, that is to say, to the positive
statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by
the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a
permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate.
...It never has been supposed by us, that the section did
apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more gen-
eral nature . . .as, for example . . . questions of general
commercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to
perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain,
upon general reasoning and legal analogies . . . what is the
just rule . . .to govern the case."
And just as Friendly, in his 1928 paper, did not have occasion to dis-
cuss Swift v. Tyson, so too he did not address the "new light" on section
34 shed by Charles Warren in a celebrated article in the Harvard Law
"a 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805) (District of Columbia not a "state" for diversity
purposes); cf National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater, 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (sustaining
the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), which made the District of Columbia
a "state" for diversity purposes).
11 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (requiring all plaintiffs to be diverse from all
defendants).
11 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) (corporation not a "citizen" for diversity pur-
poses). But cf. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844)
("[A] corporation created by doing business in a particular State is to be deemed ...
as a person ... capable of being treated as a citizen of that state ... .
14 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
"5 Section 34 is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
16 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 17-18.
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Review five years before.1"
Friendly did, however, note that in the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion Patrick Henry had inquired: "I beg gentlemen to inform me of
this-in which courts are they [diversity cases] to go, and by what law
are they to be tried?""8 And included in the matter Friendly excerpted
from the 1914 report of Dean Pound's committee was the observation:
"Moreover, the difference in the view which state and federal courts
respectively take as to the law applicable to the same case results in
irritation which has somewhat impaired the usefulness of the federal
courts in some localities."1 9
B.
Friendly's study of the beginnings of diversity jurisdiction ap-
peared in the issue of the Harvard Law Review published in February
of 1928.0 Two months later the Supreme Court decided Black and
White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co.,21 the most cele-
brated exemplar of the ills of diversity jurisdiction as exercised in the
nearly one hundred years of Swift v. Tyson's ascendancy. The Taxicab
case presented the following question: Should a federal district court in
Kentucky enforce a contract that, had it been the subject of litigation in
a Kentucky state court, would have been invalidated as contrary to
Kentucky public policy? The contract in question was between the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad and Brown and Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Company. By its terms, Brown and Yellow, in return for
good and valuable consideration, acquired the highly prized commercial
advantage of being the only taxi company given access to the Bowling
Green railroad station and its adjacent loading and parking areas.
Black and White, a competitor of Brown and Yellow's, dispatched its
taxis to the Bowling Green station in defiance of Brown and Yellow's
monopoly. Thereupon Brown and Yellow decided to go to court to pro-
1 Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REv. 49 (1923).
is Friendly, supra note 2, at 490.
19 Id. at 483 n.2.
20 Lacking direct evidence on the point, I conclude on the basis of circumstantial
evidence that the February 1928 issue of the Harvard Law Review was published in
February of 1928. This conclusion appears to flout the venerable common law princi-
ple that law reviews come out late. I do not question the principle as an apt generaliza-
tion of Anglo-American experience. But it is a principle which, when invoked in partic-
ular instances, is subject to rebuttal by competent evidence. The competent
circumstantial evidence I find dispositive here is that the President of the Harvard Law
Review for volume 41 was Erwin N. Griswold, a celebrated champion of punctuality at
Gannett House and even at lesser journals without the law.
21 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
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tect its entitlement. But, anticipating that Kentucky's courts would not
look kindly on the arrangement it had made with the Louisville &
Nashville, Brown and Yellow thought it would be prudent to litigate
the issue in a federal court. This was managed by the simple expedient
of dissolving Brown and Yellow as a Kentucky corporation and trans-
ferring assets to a newly created Tennessee corporation called Brown
and Yellow. Having sloughed off its Kentucky corporate status, Brown
and Yellow then brought suit in a Kentucky federal court against two
Kentucky corporations, Black and White and the Louisville & Nash-
ville, to enjoin Black and White from interfering with the railroad's
contract with Brown and Yellow. The district court granted the re-
quested relief, the Sixth Circuit affirmed,22 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.23
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Butler, affirmed.
Justice Butler pointed out that no Kentucky statute nor any rule of
"local" Kentucky jurisprudence, such as a legal rule governing title to
Kentucky real property, was involved. Under those circumstances, since
federal courts and most state courts had customarily sustained exclusive
arrangements such as that made by Brown and Yellow and the rail-
road, the minority rule obtaining in Kentucky and Mississippi could be
disregarded:
As respects the rule of decision to be followed by federal
courts, distinction has always been made between statutes of
a State and the decisions of its courts on questions of general
law. The applicable rule sustained by many decisions of this
Court is that in determining questions of general law, the
federal courts, while inclining to follow the decisions of the
courts of the State in which the controversy arises, are free to
exercise their own independent judgment. That this case de-
pends on such a question is clearly shown by many decisions
of this Court.24
Then Justice Butler cited a host of earlier Supreme Court decisions, of
which the first and foremost was Swift v. Tyson.
Justice Holmes filed one of the last and most powerful of his great
dissents, directly challenging the notion that there are "questions of
general law" which the federal courts have independent authority to
determine:
22 15 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1926).
23 273 U.S. 690 (1927).
24 276 U.S. at 530.
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But the question is important and in my opinion the prevail-
ing doctrine has been accepted upon a subtle fallacy that
never has been analyzed. If I am right the fallacy has re-
sulted in an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the
Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or re-
spectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.
Therefore I think it proper to state what I think the fallacy
is . . .
Books written about any branch of the common law
treat it as a unit, cite cases from this Court, from the Circuit
Courts of Appeals, from the State Courts, from England and
the Colonies of England indiscriminately, and criticise them
as right or wrong according to the writer's notions of a single
theory.. . . If there were such a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless
and until changed by statute, the Courts of the United States
might be right in using their independent judgment as to
what it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy
and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there
is this outside thing to be found ...
Mr. Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1, evi-
dently under the tacit domination of the fallacy to which I
have referred, devotes some energy to showing that § 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, refers only to statutes when
it provides that except as excepted the laws of the several
States shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at com-
mon law in Courts of the United States. An examination of
the original document by a most competent hand has shown
that Mr. Justice Story probably was wrong if anyone is in-
terested to inquire what the framers of the instrument
meant. 37 Harvard Law Review 49, at pp. 81-88. But this
question is deeper than that; it is a question of the authority
by which certain particular acts, here the grant of exclusive
privileges in a railroad station, are governed. In my opinion
the authority and only authority is the State, and if that be
so, the voice adopted by the State as its own should utter the
last word. I should leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed, as I
indicated in Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co. [215 U.S. 349],
but I would not allow it to spread the assumed dominion
into new fields.2 5
25 Id. at 532-35. Justice Holmes's statement that he would "leave Swift v. Tyson
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Justices Brandeis and Stone joined Justice Holmes's dissent.
Ten years, almost to the day, after Taxicab came the decision in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
2 6
Mr. Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, sued the Erie Railroad,
a New York corporation, in a federal court in New York for injuries
that befell him when, walking at night along a pathway adjacent to the
Erie's tracks in Pennsylvania, he was knocked down by some object
protruding from a passing freight train. The Erie's defense was that,
under Pennsylvania case law, Mr. Tompkins was a trespasser to whom
no duty of care was owed. Mr. Tompkins disputed the Erie's reading
of the Pennsylvania cases, and argued that in any event the case was
governed not by the tort law prevailing in Pennsylvania but by "gen-
eral law." The Second Circuit, sustaining a $30,000 jury verdict in Mr.
Tompkins's favor, found no need to resolve the question of Pennsylva-
nia law, because
it is well settled that the question of the responsibility of a
railroad for injuries caused by its servants is one of general
law.. . . Where the public has made open and notorious use
of a railroad right of way for a long period of time and with-
out objection, the company owes to persons on such permis-
sive pathway a duty of care in the operation of its trains.27
"Because of the importance of the question whether the federal
court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania com-
mon law, [the Supreme Court] granted certiorari." '28 And the Court
reversed.
"The question for decision," the opinion began, "is whether the
oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved." 9
undisturbed ... but ... not allow it to spread the assumed dominion into new fields"
evidently reflected a view that the mischief to be abated was not so much the illusion
dear to Justice Story's heart of a "general commercial law" but the subsequently prop-
agated illusions that a federal court could speak authoritatively, with reference to the
case law of the state in which it sat, on matters of tort liability, title to land, and so
forth. Cf. Justice Holmes's dissent in Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 371
(1910), in which he notes the difficulties encountered "the moment you leave those
principles which it is desirable to make uniform throughout the United States and
which the decisions of this Court tend to make uniform."
26 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
28 Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
29 Id. at 69. This formulation of the question presented must have surprised the
parties, since counsel for the Erie, while challenging the Second Circuit's sweeping
application of Swift v. Tyson in the particular instance, had acknowledged that Justice
Story's decision was, within proper bounds, good law. Id. at 66.
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The opinion then went on to show that the promised benefits of Justice
Story's decision in Swift v. Tyson had not been forthcoming: in lieu of
the hoped-for uniformity of "general law," there had developed intri-
cate and pervasive differences between the doctrines applied in state
and federal courts in the same state. "Thus, the doctrine rendered im-
possible equal protection of the law."3" Moreover, said the Court,
Charles Warren's 1923 article-the article "by a most competent
hand" to which Holmes had adverted in his Taxicab dissent-had "es-
tablished" that the construction of section 34 of the First Judiciary Act
on which Justice Story's doctrinal edifice rested was "erroneous"; prop-
erly understood, section 34 was intended "to make certain that, in all
matters except those in which some federal law is controlling, the fed-
eral courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would
apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well
as written." '
But the Court said it would not have overturned Swift v. Tyson
merely because its statutory underpinning appeared to have crumbled:
If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely ap-
plied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutional-
ity of the course pursued has now been made clear and com-
pels us to do so ...
[T]he doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice
Holmes said, 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
the Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or
respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to cor-
rect.' In disapproving that doctrine we do not hold unconsti-
tutional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any
other Act of Congress. We merely declare that in applying
the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded
rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution
to the several States.32
The opinion in Erie was written by Justice Brandeis. Joining him
were Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, Roberts, and Black.
Justice Reed filed a concurring opinion: agreeing with the Court that
SO Id. at 75.
S1 Id. at 72-73. It will be recalled that Justice Holmes, in his Taxicab dissent,
referred to Warren's findings about section 34 in rather more tentative fashion: "An
examination of the original document by a most competent hand has shown that Mr.
Justice Story probably was wrong if anyone is interested to inquire what the framers of
the instrument meant." 276 U.S. at 535, quoted supra text accompanying note 25.
32 304 U.S. at 77-80.
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Justice Story had misunderstood the command of section 34, Justice
Reed would have overruled Swift v. Tyson on statutory grounds. In
Justice Reed's view, the availability of such a disposition made recourse
to the Constitution unnecessary and hence inappropriate. 3 Justice But-
ler filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice McReynolds joined. The
ailing Justice Cardozo did not participate in the decision.
C.
In the closing decades of the era of Swift v. Tyson, the doctrinal
flame lit by Justice Story cast a fitful light, giving uncertain guidance
to those plotting their course across the vasty deep of American law.
But extinguishing the glimmering beam, and directing all concerned to
look to other lighthouses, did not immediately calm the waters or the
mariners. Nor was all dubiety allayed by the spate of legal writing,
judicial and otherwise, that followed the Court's decision in Eie. For
long years after Justice Brandeis's pronouncement that "[t]here is no
federal general common law" '3 4 and that a new era had dawned, the
Court was at work enlarging upon-and, occasionally, tending to ob-
scure-what the Justice and his four colleagues of the Erie majority
had determined.3 5 And, at the same time, the law reviews were awash
in criticisms, defenses, refinements, elaborations, and qualifications of
Erie."6
33 It now appears that Charles Warren's research on § 34 was not as conclusive
as Justices Reed and Brandeis supposed. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 388-390 (1964); see also Fletcher, The
General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984).
34 304 U.S. at 78.
35 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198
(1956); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (with which compare
Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941)); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947);
Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
31 See, e.g., A.L.C., The Common Law of the United States, 47 YALE L.J. 1351
(1938); Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Erie: The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 741 (1974); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Corbin, The Laws of the Several
States, 50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941); Ely, The Necklace, 87 HARV. L. REv. 753 (1974);
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974); Hill, The Erie
Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427 (1958); Keefe, Gilhooley, Bailey
& Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187
(1957); McCormick & Lewins, The Collapse of 'General Law' in the Federal Courts,
33 ILL. L. REv. 126, 132 (1938); Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE
L.J. 1336 (1938); Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IOWA L. REV. 248
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Within a matter of weeks after Erie was decided, Yale's Arthur
Corbin, one of the nation's most eminent and venerated legal scholars,
published a brief essay appraising the new era Justice Brandeis had
proclaimed. The quality of the federal judicial process would indeed
suffer, Professor Corbin felt, if Erie meant that henceforth a federal
judge trying a Pennsylvania case would look only to Pennsylvania
precedents and not-as any sensible Pennsylvania state judge would
do-look to the aggregate body of developing case law across the land.
But Professor Corbin was confident that Erie was not intended to con-
strict the job of judging: "The overruling of Swift v. Tyson," wrote
Corbin,
is a matter of much less importance than it may seem to
many. On the whole, its effect may be beneficial. It will not
affect "vested rights" or invalidate the numerous decisions
rendered on the theory stated by Mr. Justice Story. In actual
practice, it will not deprive the federal judge of the freedom
and power that have been his. It is not an order by Brandeis,
J., that hereafter Learned Hand, J., must take his law from
the words of Finch, J. If it is an admonition to federal judges
that there is no "federal general common law" that is to be
found solely in the opinions of other federal judges, much is
thereby gained. But if it is a direction to substitute an omni-
presence brooding over Pennsylvania alone, in place of the
roc-like bird whose wings have been believed to overspread
forty-eight states, something has indeed been lost.3'
Professor Harry Shulman, a junior colleague of Corbin's, wrote a
companion piece. Shulman-like Friendly, a former Brandeis law
clerk-was confident that federal judges implementing Erie would still
have a useful role to play in the development of state law: "Federal
judges may still analyze, expose, criticize or excoriate the rule which
they may feel compelled to follow."s8 But Shulman also felt that the
Court could have overturned Swift v. Tyson without invoking the Con-
stitution and without abandoning Justice Story's construction of section
34: thiq could have been accomplished, so Shulman explained, if the
Court were to have adopted a new judge-made rule of deference to state
decisions for those diversity cases to which section 34, as construed by
Story, did not apply-that is, those in which no state statute was appli-
cable. Some years later a sharper attack on Erie was mounted by a
(1963).
37 A.L.C., supra note 36, at 1353.
3' Shulman, supra note 36, at 1349.
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professor-turned-judge, the redoubtable Charles E. Clark of the Second
Circuit. Judge Clark also felt that the evils of Swift v. Tyson could have
been cured by a remedy far less drastic than excommunicating it as
unconstitutional.3 9
Early in 1964, five years after he ascended the bench, Henry
Friendly delivered the annual Cardozo Lecture at the Bar Association
of the City of New York. Friendly's brilliant paper was a proper se-
quel to the study of the origins of the diversity jurisdiction he had
worked on in the library of the Association so many summers before.
The paper was a proper tribute not only to Justice Cardozo but also to
two of Friendly's mentors, Justice Brandeis and Professor-turned-Jus-
tice 'Frankfurter. Twenty-five years after the event, Friendly gave his
assessment of Erie and its implications.
In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law40 devel-
oped two themes. The first of them was that Erie was rightly decided
and that the stated ground of decision-"the unconstitutionality of the
course pursued" under Swift v. Tyson-was the right ground. The sec-
ond theme was that, by getting federal courts out of the business of
declaring law they had no authority to make, Erie had cleared the
ground on which federal courts could erect an authentic federal legal
structure. This authentic federal law was a federal common law com-
mensurate with and supportive of the federal legislative power-a com-
mon law whose sensible articulation depends on judicial sensitivity to
the clues, of whatever clarity, Congress may have provided as to the
lines along which, and the constraints within which, legislative objec-
tives may in some measure be implemented by the courts. This second
theme is discussed elsewhere in these tributes. The first theme-the
legitimacy of Erie-constituted the first half of Friendly's paper. To
attempt to condense his argument would be impertinent. Suffice it to
say that Friendly canvassed the major (and minor) criticisms of Erie
and left them pulverized. He showed that under the aegis of Swift v.
Tyson federal courts established under article III of the Constitution
39 Judge Clark suggested that a better opinion would have been crafted by Justice
Cardozo's "gentler touch." Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 YALE L.J. 267,
295-96 (1946); see also Clark, Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie-Tompkins, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 24, 33 (1953). In Professor Crosskey's remarkable
constitutional cosmology, what was unconstitutional was Erie: under Professor Cross-
key's Constitution, far from there being no "federal general common law," the single
legitimate form of American common law was federal common law, which it was a
principal function of the federal courts, culminating in the Supreme Court, to deter-
mine, and which was binding on state courts. 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 610-674 (1953).
0 Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383 (1964).
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were encouraged to, and effectively did, fashion rules for the resolution
of controversies arising out of conduct beyond the regulatory power
vested in Congress by article I of the Constitution. That asymmetry of
articles III and I had worked a fundamental distortion of the federal
system. A basic postulate of the federal system is that the national au-
thority, not simply of Congress but of all three branches of the govern-
ment of the United States, is limited,4" with the balance of authority
"reserved," according to the tenth amendment, "to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." To redress the injury done by Swift v. Tyson
to the federal system, and to prevent its recurrence, not only the deci-
sion in Erie but its constitutionally based ratio decidendi was essential.
To have pitched the decision on other than constitutional grounds
would have weakened it and invited its erosion.
Friendly did more than justify Erie. He was at pains to show its
limits. In particular, Friendly made clear that nothing decided or an-
nounced in Erie prejudged, one way or another, the Court's decision
three years later, in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co.,42 that a federal court sitting in diversity must follow the choice of
law rules of the state in which it sits. 43 Friendly put the matter this
way:
Published materials cast no certain light on how Brandeis
would have voted when the choice of law issue first arose for
decision, and speculation on that score seems rather idle.
The questions are of the utmost difficulty and do not yield to
any simple solution. I shall make only two observa-
tions-first, that the problems would exist however Erie was
decided, and second, that, in my view, the constitutional ba-
sis of Erie does not apply to choice of law issues even when
diversity is the sole basis of federal jurisdiction and a fortiori
when it is not. For Congress to direct a federal court sitting
41 It is limited, that is, except for such matters as the management of foreign and
military matters and the governance of the District of Columbia and of territories and
possessions, where all sovereignty is vested in the United States. Cf United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Of course these sweeping national
powers, like all other powers vested in the United States, are subject to the constraints
of the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Constitution.
42 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
4' Because Erie involved a Pennsylvania accident and was tried in New York, it
could conceivably have posed a choice of law problem (assuming, as the Supreme Court
did in fact decide, that "local" law was to be applied). But none of the opinions filed in
Erie, either in the Supreme Court or in the Second Circuit en route to (90 F.2d 603
(1937)) and from (98 F.2d 49 (1938)) the Supreme Court, offers any ground for sup-
posing that anyone at any point in the litigation posited any law other than Pennsylva-
nia's as the relevant "local" law.
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in State A whether to apply the internal law of State A, B or
C, or to use its own judgment which to apply, can well be
said to be "necessary and proper" to enabling federal judges
to function and consistent with the general role of the central
government under the Constitution, in a way that prescrip-
tion of a code of substantive law to supplant the otherwise
applicable law of a state is not."'
Friendly's careful statement was not in terms a submission that
Klaxon's insistence on federal court conformity with state choice-of-law
rules yields bad results. Friendly went no further than saying that
Klaxon was not compelled by the Constitution-an observation calcu-
lated to suggest to Congress, and obliquely to the Supreme Court, that
Klaxon ought not be taken as a necessary consequence of Erie and was,
therefore, open to independent reexamination. Others have reinforced
Friendly's careful submission. Recently, two conflicts scholars have
written:
Klaxon seems not to rest on the same Constitutional prohibi-
tions, despite the Court's statement to the contrary. As a
number of commentators have shown, the ordering of the re-
lations among the States of the Union is a uniquely federal
function. The reach of state laws, albeit limited by the loose
standards of the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses, should no more be left to the unilateral determina-
tion by individual states than is the determination of their
physical boundaries."45
And it would seem that reexamination of the utility of Klaxon is now
overdue, given the radical shifts in choice-of-law method that have
come about since Klaxon was decided. For in these past four decades
the pendulum of choice of law has swung a long way from Bealian
conceptualisms that purported to promise that every potential forum
would look to the same state's substantive law to doctrines of, inter alia,
"interest analysis," which, when the forum is one of two or more states
with identifiable links to the controversy, avowedly favor the parochial
claims of forum substantive law.4"
44 Friendly, supra note 40, at 401-02. It is to be noted that Professor Shulman, in
his prescient essay written right after Erie, pointed out that one of the important
choices which would confront federal courts trying cases under the new dispensation
would be, "[W]hat state's rule of conflict of laws is to govern?" Shulman, supra note
36, at 1351. It seems a fair inference that he did not see that choice foreclosed by the
Erie decision itself.
" E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 112 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
6 See D. CURRIE, R. CRAMTON & H. KAYE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 201-309 (3d
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The Klaxon question pinpointed by Henry Friendly in his schol-
arly paper was, and remains, a problem of significant academic inter-
est. But in deciding cases, Henry Friendly has found the Klaxon ques-
tion to be more than an academic problem. Shortly before he wrote his
paper, his court had considered en banc a case in which the argument
for following the forum's choice-of-law rule seemed to Friendly quite
unpersuasive. The case was Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,47 a federal
court replication of New York's celebrated Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines.
48
D.
Edward J. Kilberg and John S. Pearson, both New Yorkers, were
passengers on a Northeast Airlines flight that, on August 15, 1958, left
LaGuardia Airport bound for Nantucket. The plane crashed as it was
about to land. Kilberg and Pearson both died in the crash. The suit
arising out of Kilberg's death was brought in a New York state court;
the suit arising out of Pearson's death was brought in a New York
federal court. Because New York practice is hospitable to interlocutory
appeals, Kilberg reached authoritative appellate disposition before
Pearson.
The plaintiff-administrator in Kilberg sought to recover for breach
of contract or, in the alternative, for wrongful death. The contract
claim alleged breach of Northeast Airlines' undertaking to provide the
decedent safe carriage, as embodied in the ticket purchased by Kilberg
at LaGuardia Airport; the contract claim alleged, inter alia, "loss of
accumulations of prospective earnings of the deceased," in support of
an ad damnum of $150,000. The administrator's wrongful death claim
was, however, confined to $15,000, the ceiling on damages contained in
the Massachusetts statute under which the claim arose:
Damages for death by negligence of common carrier. If the
proprietor of a common carrier of passengers . . . causes the
death of a passenger, he or it shall be liable in damages in
the sum of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen
thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree
of culpability of the defendant or of his or its servants or
agents.49
ed. 1983).
47 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
48 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
49 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1933). In 1961, the year
in which Kilberg was decided by the New York Court of Appeals and the year before
1984]
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Arguing that pursuit of a claim sounding in contract was not a
proper device for circumventing the wrongful death damage limitation
contained in the Massachusetts statute, Northeast Airlines moved to
strike the contract claim. The trial court, sitting at Special Term, de-
nied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed. The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed:
If the alleged contract breach had caused injuries not result-
ing in death, a New York-governed contract suit would, we
will assume, be available. . . . But it is law long settled that
wrongful death actions, being unknown to the common law,
derive from statutes only and that the statute which governs
such an action is that of the place of the wrong. . . . It fol-
lows, as the Appellate Division correctly held here . . . that
the [contract] cause of action had to be dismissed."0
Since no other issues had been tendered on appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals, one might have supposed-and three members of the court did
suppose-that the propriety of the Appellate Division's dismissal of the
contract claim was all that the Court of Appeals had to rule on. But the
majority saw more in the case. The unavailability of a New York con-
tract claim alternative to the Massachusetts wrongful death claim "[did]
not mean . . .that for this alleged wrong plaintiff cannot possibly re-
cover more than the $15,000 maximum specified in the Massachusetts
act." And the court went on to explain why:
The number of States limiting death case damages has be-
come small over the years but there are still 14 of them ...
An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few
hours' duration pass through several of those common-
wealths. His plane may meet with disaster in a State he
never intended to cross but into which the plane has flown
because of bad weather or other unexpected developments, or
an airplane's catastrophic descent may begin in one State
and end in another. The place of injury becomes entirely for-
tuitous. Our courts should if possible provide protection for
our own State's people against unfair and anachronistic
treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters.
Since both Massachusetts . . .and New York . . .au-
Pearson reached the Second Circuit, the $15,000 statutory ceiling was raised to
$20,000. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553, 555 n.1 (2d Cir. 1962).
61 Kilberg, 9 N.Y.2d at 38-39, 176 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
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thorize wrongful death suits against common carriers, the
only controversy is as to amount of damages recoverable.
New York's public policy prohibiting the imposition of limits
on such damages is strong, clear and old. Since the Constitu-
tion of 1894, our basic law has been . . . that "The right of
action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting
in death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount recover-
able shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."
As to conflict of law rules it is of course settled that the
law of the forum is usually in control as to procedures in-
cluding remedies. . . . As to whether the measure of dam-
ages should be treated as a procedural or a substantive mat-
ter in wrongful death cases, there is authority both ways.
...It is open to us, therefore, particularly in view of our
own strong public policy as to death action damages, to treat
the measure of damages in this case as being controlled by
our own State policies.
From all of this it follows that while plaintiff's second
or contract claim is demurrable, his first count declaring
under the Massachusetts wrongful death action is not only
sustainable but can be enforced, if the proof so justifies,
without regard to the $15,000 limit. Plaintiff, therefore, may
apply if he be so advised for leave to amend his first cause of
action accordingly.5"
Judge Fuld, concurring without much enthusiasm on the contract
claim, 52 felt it inappropriate for the court to rule sua sponte on the
unpresented wrongful death claim. Judge Froessel, joined by Judge
Van Voorhis, concurred on the contract claim and agreed with Judge
Fuld that no other question was properly before the court; however,
since the majority had undertaken to address the question, Judge
51 Id. at 39-42, 176 N.E.2d at 527-29, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135-38. "Kilberg's ad-
ministrator ultimately settled for less that $15,000 and did not seek leave to amend his
first cause of action. Presumably, this was because he did not believe he could prove
greater damages." W. RaFsE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 466 (8th ed.
1984).
5 Judge Fuld was "[i]mpressed . . .by the theoretical soundness" of the argu-
ment that entry into a contract of safe carriage in New York was "a more 'significant
contact' than the adventitious occurrence of the crash in Massachusetts," in view of
which "it might well be .... urged, this State's wrongful death statute and not that of
Massachusetts should apply." But Judge Fuld felt this approach was "foreclosed by
our decisions." Kilberg, 9 N.Y.2d at 45, 172 N.E.2d at 531, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
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Froessel went on to express disagreement with the majority's treatment
of the ceiling on damages under the wrongful death claim. Grafting
New York's unlimited recovery on the Massachusetts statute was, ac-
cording to Judge Froessel, not only bad choice of law but, very likely,
in contravention of the full faith and credit clause.
53
Kilberg was decided in 1961. Whatever slender conceptual rooting
it had-namely, the New York Court of Appeals's characterization of
damages as a "procedural" issue to be determined by the law of the
forum-vanished a year later. In Davenport v. Webb the Court of Ap-
peals, in explaining its decision to apply the Maryland rather than the
New York rule on prejudgment interest in a wrongful death case aris-
ing in Maryland, distinguished Kilberg by saying that it rested on "this
State's strong policy with respect to limitations in wrongful death ac-
tions," 54 not on the terra infirma that damages are procedural.
But recognition of the jurisprudential vacuity of Kilberg did not
need to await the opinion in Davenport v. Webb. It would have been
sufficient in 1961, and it remains sufficient today, to compare the
Kilberg opinion with Judge Cardozo's opinion over four decades before
in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co..55
Everett Loucks, a New York resident, was killed when a Standard
Oil truck hit his automobile on a Massachusetts highway. A wrongful
death action was brought in a New York court. Suit was founded on a
Massachusetts statute that provided:
If a person or corporation by his or its negligence, or by the
negligence of his or its agents or servants while engaged in
his or its business, causes the death of a person who is in the
exercise of due care and not in his or its employment or ser-
vice, he or it shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less
than $500 nor more than $10,000, to be assessed with refer-
ence to the degree of his or its culpability, or that of his or its
servants. 56
Special Term denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Ap-
pellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals, in its turn, reversed
the Appellate Division, rejecting both of the grounds on which Stan-
dard Oil relied in contending that the suit was not cognizable in a New
York court.
53 Id. at 51, 172 N.E.2d at 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
- 11 N.Y. 2d 392, 395 , 183 N.E. 2d 902, 904, 230 N.Y.S. 2d 17, 20 (1961).
55 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
5' R.L. c. 171, § 2, as amended by 1907 Mass. Acts, ch. 375. The statute involved
in Kilberg, while closely comparable with this one, was addressed solely to the liability
of a common carrier for negligently causing the death of a passenger.
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Judge Cardozo dealt first with Standard Oil's claim that the Mas-
sachusetts statute, couched in terms of degrees of culpability, was "pe-
nal" and hence not enforceable in a jurisdiction other than
Massachusetts.
It is true that the offender is punished, but the purpose of
the punishment is reparation to those aggrieved by his of-
fense. . . . The executor or administrator who sues under
this statute is not the champion of the peace and order and
public justice of the commonwealth of Massachusetts. He is
the representative of the outraged family. He vindicates a
private right.5
Then Judge Cardozo turned to Standard Oil's second line of
defense:
Another question remains. Even though the statute is not pe-
nal, it differs from our own. We must determine whether the
difference is a sufficient reason for declining jurisdiction. A
tort committed in one state creates a right of action that may
be sued upon in another unless public policy forbids.
This test applied, there is nothing in the Massachusetts
statute that outrages the public policy of New York. We
have a statute which gives a civil remedy where death is
caused in our own state. We have thought it so important
that we have now imbedded it in the Constitution. (Const.
Art. 1, § 18). The fundamental policy is that there shall be
some atonement for the wrong. Through the defendant's
negligence, a resident of New York has been killed in Mas-
sachusetts. He has left a widow and children who are also
residents. The law of Massachusetts gives them a recom-
pense for his death. It cannot be that public policy forbids
our courts to help in collecting what belongs to them. We
cannot give them the same judgment that our law would give
if the wrong had been done here. Very likely we cannot give
them as much. But that is no reason for refusing to give
them what we can.58
Kilberg had already been decided by the New York Court of Ap-
peals when Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,59 arising out of the same
6 Loucks, 224 N.Y. at 103-06, 120 N.E. at 199-200.
" Id. at 106-12, 120 N.E. at 200-02.
5, 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.), rev'd en
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Nantucket crash, came on for trial in the Southern District of New
York. On the authority of Kilberg, Judge McGohey denied Northeast
Airlines's motion to limit the administratrix's maximum recoverable
damages to Massachusetts's $15,000 ceiling.60 From a judgment for
plaintiff in the sum of $134,043.77 (to which later was added
$26,160.88 in interest), Northeast Airlines appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit. A divided panel reversed: Judge Swan, joined by Chief Judge
Lumbard, held that Kilberg's disregard of the Massachusetts ceiling on
wrongful death damages denied full faith and credit to a critical aspect
of Massachusetts's statutory scheme."1 Judge Kaufman dissented.
62
Pearson was then heard by the Second Circuit en banc. This time
the prevailing opinion was Judge Kaufman's, upholding the jury ver-
dict. In rejecting the full faith and credit claim, Judge Kaufman ac-
knowledged that "New York [in Kilberg] reiterated its partial adher-
ence to the rule of lex loci delictus," but he added that
[i]n doing so New York is not bound to model all of the
rules governing this litigation in which it is conceded it has a
legitimate interest, on Massachusetts law . . . . New York
may examine each issue in the litigation-the conduct which
creates liability, the parties who may bring an action, the
extent of liability, the period during which the liability may
be sued upon. . . -and by weighing the contacts of various
states with the transaction, New York may, without interfer-
ing with the Constitution, shape its rules controlling the
litigation.63
Judge Friendly, joined by Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge
Moore, dissented." The heart of the dissent follows:
I find nothing in the Federal Constitution that would pre-
vent the legislature of New York from amending its wrong-
banc, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
e0 199 F. Supp. at 540. Pearson is an instance in which the applicable choice-of-
law rule is manifest. That is not always the case. In Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines,
276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated and remanded, 365 U.S. 293, prior judg-
ment reinstated, 290 F.2d 904, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961), Judge Friendly
stated that it was his court's "principal task . . . to determine what the New York
courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither
has thought."
61 Pearson v. Northeast Air Lines, 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.), rev'd en banc, 309
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
62 Id. at 136.
13 Pearson v. Northeast Air Lines, 309 F.2d 553, 560-61 (2d Cir. 1962) (en
banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
" See id. at 564. As a senior judge, Judge Swan did not participate in the en banc
review.
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ful death act, Decedent Estate Law, § 130 et seq., to include
the death in a sister state of a New York resident travelling
on a flight from New York on a ticket purchased in New
York, or the courts of New York from now reading its
wrongful death act to cover such a case ...
It is common ground that New York has not followed
any of the courses just outlined .. . The [Kilberg] majority
likewise disclaimed any idea that recovery might be had, in
tort, under New York's wrongful death act. Chief Judge
Desmond said. . . with entire clarity: "We will still require
plaintiff to sue on the Massachusetts statute but we refuse
on public policy grounds to enforce one of its provisions as to
damages"-"We. . . refuse to apply that part of the Mas-
sachusetts law." . . . Appellant contends that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, Art. IV, § 1, and the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment forbid this.
A superficially attractive answer is that if New York
could validly arrive at the [Kilberg] result on a theory of con-
tract or through amendment or construction of its own
wrongful death act, the Constitution does not demand a dif-
ferent conclusion because New York attains the same goal
through excising or altering a provision of the Massachusetts
Act. I say "superficially attractive" since the two processes
differ not only conceptually. . . but practically as well....
Granted that whenever a New York court enters a judgment,
it is enforcing New York "law", and that New York may
often make the same rules that govern transactions within
New York apply to events in a sister state, it does not follow
that when New York looks to a statute of a sister state as the
source of a claim enforceable in its courts, the Constitution
allows it to decline, in the Supreme Court's words, "to give
full faith and credit to all those substantial provisions of the
statute which inhered in the cause of action or which name
conditions on which the right to sue depend[s]." Tennessee
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914).
An important reason why a forum state may not do this
is that it thereby interferes with the proper freedom of action
of the legislature of the sister state. . . . The Full Faith and
Credit Clause insures that, in making its choice, the legisla-
ture creating the claim need not have to weigh the risk that
the courts of sister states looking to its "public acts" as a
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source of rights will disregard substantial conditions which it
has imposed-a calculation that would involve variables so
numerous and unpredictable as to preclude any intelligent
choice.1
5
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.0 6 This was unfortunate. Su-
preme Court review of the constitutional issues separating Judges
Friendly and Kaufman might have broadened our understanding of the
constraints full faith and credit imposes on choice of law."
E.
As of 1989, the First Judiciary Act, and the federal judiciary itself,
will be two hundred years old. Throughout all this time-and notwith-
standing criticism that began before the federal courts themselves began
and that has continued almost without let-up to the present
day-diversity jurisdiction has been a major component of federal judi-
cial activity.
As of 1988, diversity jurisdiction will have been governed by Erie
for fifty years. Erie has made more difference in the way federal judges
handle diversity cases than Professor Corbin anticipated. Professor
Corbin felt that Erie was "not an order by Brandeis, J., that hereafter
Learned Hand, J., must take his law from the words of Finch, J."8
But, as Erie reaches middle age, Friendly, J., and Wisdom, J., and
other conscientious federal judges are quite accustomed to taking their
law from the words of the state court judges in the states in which they
sit. 9 Moreover-and more important-Professor Shulman's post-Erie
65 Id. at 564-65.
68 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
17 In the Supreme Court's most recent consideration of the constraints the Consti-
tution imposes on choice of law, the four plurality Justices (Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) and the three dissenting Justices (Justice
Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist) appeared to agree that full
faith and credit and due process impose the same demands. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302 (1981). In lonely concurrence (Justice Stewart did not participate), Jus-
tice Stevens acknowledged that there was substantial authority for the proposition that
these two limitations are "indistinguishable." Id. at 321. But Justice Stevens went on to
argue that the two constitutional mandates are rooted in very different policies and
should be kept distinct in analysis and application. The point is an important one, with
significant implications. It is to be hoped that the Court will find an early opportunity
to revisit the nexus between full faith and credit and choice of law.
88 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
69 Adopting the colorful simile of his late colleague, Judge Jerome Frank, Judge
Friendly has said that "[w]hen the state law is plain, the federal judge is reduced to a
'ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state.'" H. FRIENDLY, supra
note 2, at 142 (quoting Judge Frank's opinion in Richardson v. Commissioner, 126
F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942)). The job of a federal judge is very different when the
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reassurance that "[f]ederal judges may still analyze, expose, criticize or
excoriate the [applicable state court] rule"' 0 is not often vindicated in
practice. Most federal judges do not relish skewering an unwise but
clearly authoritative state court rule except in those rare instances, of
which the dissent by Friendly, J., in Pearson is a notable example, in
which the unwisdom of the state court rule is deemed so egregious as to
be unconstitutional.
What Erie has accomplished is to cure the besetting problem noted
by Dean Pound's committee in 1914-"the difference in the view
which state and federal courts respectively take as to the law applicable
to the same case."7' This was a problem created not by diversity juris-
diction itself but by Swift v. Tyson, whose doctrine, as Brandeis suc-
cinctly put it, "rendered impossible equal protection of the law."'72 For
this accomplishment, primary credit must go to Brandeis. But Holmes,
the author of the Taxicab dissent, is entitled to a goodly measure of
praise. So too is Frankfurter, who persuaded one of his ablest students
to write a paper on the beginnings of diversity jurisdiction. And so too
is the student, Henry Friendly, who wrote the excellent paper, then
clerked for Brandeis in the year of Taxicab, and thirty-five years later
returned to the lists to put to rout the doubters of Erie.
From Henry Friendly's point of view, Erie is merely a palliative.
If Friendly had his "druthers," diversity jurisdiction-which today ac-
counts for approximately one-fourth of the nationwide civil docket of
the federal district courts 7 -would be handed back to the state courts.
Friendly came to the brink of so recommending in 1928, in the paper
written at the urging of Professor Frankfurter. 74 In 1973, Friendly
wrote: "Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that '[a]n Act for the elimination
of diversity jurisdiction could fairly be called an Act for the relief of
federal courts.' . . . [T]he time for such relief has come. '75 Perhaps so,
but there seems little reason to expect that Congress will erect Frank-
state law is murky. See, e.g., supra note 63.
70 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
712 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
73 Of 224,774 civil cases (not counting land condemnation cases) terminated in
district courts in the year ending December 31, 1983, 52,115 were diversity cases. Of
the 11,890 civil cases that went to trial, 4556 were diversity cases. STATISTIcAL ANAL-
YSIS AND REPORTS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURING THE TWELVE MONTH
PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1983 A 24-25.
"I See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
75 H. FRIENDLY, supra note 2, at 142. Justice Frankfurter's remark appears in
his dissenting opinion in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582, 651 (1949).
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furter's "Act for the relief of federal courts" into law much before the
tercentenary of the First Judiciary Act. Until then, federal judges will
follow the path charted by Brandeis.
III.
We honor an able lawyer who, in the twenty-five years since his
appointment to the bench, has rendered extraordinary judicial service.
The manifold skills Judge Friendly has brought to bear on the work of
the Second Circuit would have enriched the judicial process at an even
higher level of adjudication. One can, however, surmise that, if Henry
Friendly had for these past many years been a Justice, he would not
have undertaken more than a handful of the numerous scholarly works
which have comprised so brilliant a counterpoint to his hundreds of
circuit court opinions. It is true that, as noted at the beginning of this
essay, a few renowned American judges have also been scholars of great
consequence. But of these only Story-in a far more leisurely
era-carried on sustained scholarly endeavors while serving on the Su-
preme Court.
An exemplary judge and scholar, Henry Friendly may fittingly
appropriate to his own use the words of Robert Frost:
My object in living is to unite
My avocation and my vocation
As my two eyes make one in sight."
76 R. FROST, Two Tramps in Mud Time, in COMPLETE PoEms OF ROBERT
FROST 357 (1949).
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